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who should be expected to stop and render needful assistance, and that the de-
fendant's claim that he owed himself no duty was without merit.' 4
In the instant case the court expressly refused to follow the Saylor case,15 and
without the equivocal language of the Brugh case regarding the duty of drivers
on a public highway, adopted the reasoning of Professor Bohlen when he said:
The rescuer's right of action, therefore, must rest upon the view that one who imperils
another, at a place where there may be bystanders, must take into account the chance that
some bystander will yield to the meritorious impulse to save life or even property from destruc-
tion, and attempt a rescue. If this is so, the right of action depends not upon the wrongfulness
of the defendant's conduct in its tendency to imperil the person whose rescue is attempted,
but upon its tendency to cause the rescuer to take the risk involved in the attempted rescue.'
6
The court concluded that a lack of self-protective care may be negligence to-
wards any person in whose vicinity one exposes one's self to undue risk of injury.
This holding suggests a strong analogy to the cases where the plaintiff receives
injuries from shock as a result of discovering the body of a suicide, 7 in which it
is arguable that the suicide has behaved negligently if his manner and place of
self-destruction is such that shock to persons making the discovery would fore-
seeably arise.' 8 The rescue cases may appear more difficult since the conduct
may not be characterized as "willful," as it can be in the suicide cases.
There remains the possibility that a court may feel that avoiding danger is so
strong and natural an instinct that one who has endangered himself could not
be said to have reasonably foreseen the hazard. 9 Although this may be a proper
consideration for a jury, it does not seem to be a strong enough basis for directed
verdicts of no cause of action as a matter of law.
Workmen's Compensation Acts-Security Funds-Security Fund Subro-
gated to Employee's Rights against Employer-[Illinois].-An employee of the
defendant Illinois corporation was injured in Wisconsin in the course of his em-
14 Ibid.
's Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 344, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 902, 909 (1946). "We think there
was a legal duty owing by the defendant to the plaintiff not to create an undue risk of injury
to him and not merely a moral duty as was held in Saylor v. Parsons .......
6 Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts 569, n. 33 (1926).
'7 Blakely v. Shortal's Estate, 236 Iowa 787, 2o N.W. 2d 28 (1945), noted in 13 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 215 (1946), where recovery from the estate of the suicide was allowed.
18 "It would seem that a person who carelessly exposes himself to danger or who attempts
to take his life in a place where others may be expected to be, does commit a wrongful act
toward them in that it exposes them to a recognizable risk of injury." Bohlen, Studies in the
Law of Torts 569, n. 33 (1926).
'9 The court in the Saylor case may have had this in mind when it said, after settling the
case on the duty issue, "In the first place there is nothing in the record to indicate that Parsons,
in the exercise of ordinary care, could not have undermined the wall with safety to himself.
That he so intended must be presumed, for the presumption in favor of prudence is always to
be indulged in until the contrary appears. If, then, he might have performed the work with
safety to himself, neither he nor the company is chargeable with negligence for not antici-
pating that he would do it otherwise, and that, if he so did, somebody would attempt to
rescue him." Saylor v. Parsons, 122 Iowa 679, 684, 98 N.W. 5o, 502 (1904).
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ployment. The defendant was insured against workmen's compensation liabil-
ity with a mutual carrier which had contributed to the Wisconsin mutual work-
men's compensation security fund. This fund, established by the state' to as-
sure compensation benefits to workers whose employers had insured themselves
in carriers which thereafter became insolvent, was maintained by mandatory
annual contributions from each mutual carrier licensed to insure workmen's
compensation liability in Wisconsin. After the employee's injury, the defend-
ant's insurer was taken over by a stock company which became insolvent with-
out having paid the employee's compensation awards. Thereupon the plaintiff,
custodian of the Wisconsin's workmen's compensation security funds, paid the
awards as required by the statute establishing the funds, and brought this ac-
tion in Illinois to recover that amount from the defendant, claiming a common-
law right to be subrogated to the injured employee, and a statutory right to pro-
ceed to recover sums paid from the security funds as awards. On appeal, held,
the plaintiff was entitled to both common-law and statutory subrogation. Judg-
ment dismissing the action reversed. Smith v. Clavey Ravinia Nurseries.2
In permitting statutory recovery by the fund custodian against the employer,
the Illinois court, in the first case of its kind under the Wisconsin statute, has
set a precedent for a new interpretation of the function of a workmen's compen-
sation security fund. By basing its decision also upon the ground of common-
law subrogation, the court has evidently intended to effect an extension of that
doctrine.
Workmen's compensation security funds were established in five states3 as a
depression measure because insolvencies of compensation insurers had rendered
many compensation awards worthless.. The section of the Wisconsin act relied
on by the plaintiff provides that "the state treasurer as custodian of the funds
shall proceed to recover the sums of all liabilities of such [insolvent] carrier as-
sumed by such funds from such carrier, its receiver, liquidator, rehabilitator or
trustee in bankruptcy, employers, and all other liable, and may prosecute an ac-
tion or other proceedings therefor." s In permitting the plaintiff to recover under
this section, the court interpreted the insertion of "employers" to mean that
employers were directly liable to the security fund for awards paid by it to their
own employees, for otherwise, it was said, the funds would be depleted and their
purpose frustrated.6
I Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § 102.65.
2 329 Il. App. 548, 69 N.E. 2d 921 (1946).
3 New Jersey, 1935, N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 34, c. I5, §§ 103-120; New York, 1935, N.Y.
Workmen's Compensation Law (McKinney, 1946) c. 67, § xo6; North Carolina, x935, N.C.
Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1943) c. 97, §§ 105-122; Pennsylvania, 1937, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1937) tit. 7, §§ x052-io66; Wisconsin, 1935, Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § 102.65.
4 Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation 578 (1936).
sWis. Stat. (Brossard, 2943) § 102.65(11).
6 Smith v. Clavey Ravinia Nurseries, 329 Ill. App. 548, 557, 69 N.E. 2d 921, 925 (1946).
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This interpretation of the court seems open to question in the light of a com-
parison of the Wisconsin statute with those of the other states. The New Jersey7
and North Carolina8 statutes contain no provisions for recovery of awards paid
by their funds, from insolvent insurers or from employers. The New York
statute requires proceedings for recovery against insolvent insurers, but ex-
pressly prohibits any proceedings against employers.9 The Pennsylvania statute
as originally enactedlo contained a provision for recovery identical with that of
the Wisconsin statute, but was later amended to delete "employers." '" In all
states, contributions by carriers to security funds bear the same proportion to
the earned premiums of the contributors. Nevertheless, it seems that the legis-
latures of the states other than Wisconsin did not anticipate depletion of the
funds, although their fund custodians were not authorized to recover awards
paid from employers. It is possible, therefore, that by "employers" the Wiscon-
sin statute refers to all the employer members of insolvent mutual or reciprocal
carriers, rather than to the individual employers to whose employees awards
have been paid. As policyholders, employers may have been intended to become
liable along with "its [the insolvent carrier's] receiver, liquidator, rehabilitator
or trustee in bankruptcy .... " to discharge the obligations of the carriers.-
In placing ultimate liability on the defendant, the court seems to have viewed
the security fund as an emergency fund rather than as a reinsurance measure.
However, an opposite conclusion seems better founded. The Wisconsin act
merely states that the funds are created "for the purpose of assuring .... the
benefits .... provided for employments insured in insolvent .... carriers."'' 3
Such language is entirely consistent with a description of a reinsurance scheme.
Writers in the field of workmen's compensation insurance consider these funds
clearly reinsurance measures.14 The funds of each state, including the states
that do not authorize recovery by the fund custodian against employers, are
maintained by required contributions of one percent per year of premiums
earned within the state on workmen's compensation insurance, and accumulate
7 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 34, C. IS, §§ X03-120.
8 N.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1943) C. 97, §§ 105-122.
9 N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law (McKinney, 1946) c. 67, §§ Io9-c(3), Io9-g.
1o Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1937) tit. 77, § io6i.
" Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1946), tit. 77, § io6i.
X2 Cf. In re Builders' Mutual Casualty Co., 229 Wis. 365, 282 N.W. 44 (1938). This deci-
sion upheld the right of the Wisconsin insurance commissioner to levy against the policy
holders of insolvent mutual workmen's compensation insurers. The assessments in this case
were in the amount of twenty per cent of the premiums earned in the years in which the losses
leading to insolvency occurred. The levy was held to be authorized by statute. Wis. Stat.
(Brossard, 1943) §§ 200.o8-200.09. This provision is applicable to an "insurance company or
fraternal or mutual benefit society," and hence also covers reciprocal carriers.
13 Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) §§ 102.65(2), (4), (6).
'4 Hobbs, Workmen's Compensation Insurance 433 (I939); Kreech, Workmen's Compensa-
tion in North Carolina 1929-1940, 71, 123-25 (1942).
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until they equal, less liabilities, five per cent of the total loss reserves of the con-
tributing carriers.'s One writer, in adducing typical instances of reinsurance
rates in various fields of liability insurance, offers as example two unnamed large
carriers; the percentages of their reinsurance premiums to earned premiums
average one per cent.,6 The Workmen's Compensation Reinsurance Bureau,
established in 1914, composed of twenty-eight stock carriers, reinsures members
against losses not arising in extra-hazardous industries. Members contribute
one per cent of premiums earned on coverage outside New York. Because inter-
est on funds so established has often been sufficient to meet liabilities the Bureau
has frequently been able to return premiums to members.X7 Reinsurance rates
in the field of workmen's compensation underwriting seem, therefore, to ap-
proximate the rate of contribution to the state security funds. If the fund in the
instant case is viewed as having reinsured employers against compensation lia-
bility, recovery by the fund custodian from the individual employer on any
theory of subrogation seems anomalous.
Nevertheless, the court's views on common-law subrogation are worth atten-
tion. Although the court argued that by its reference to "employers" the statute
expressly provided for subrogation in a case like the present, the decision is also
based on common-law subrogation. This holding raises the other interesting
question in the case.
Subrogation is said to be an equitable right, existing independently of con-
tract; 8 the lack of contractual relationship in the present case between plain-
tiff and defendant or defendant's employee is therefore unimportant. The com-
mon law has nevertheless been hesitant to permit recovery for benefits conferred
and retained in absence of a request or agreement to pay for them.' 9 A line of
Illinois and Wisconsin cases has held that one who pays the debt of another,
with no express or implied agreement for subrogation, is not entitled to succeed
to the rights of the satisfied creditor, unless there is some obligation, interest, or
right distinguishing his status from that of a "mere volunteer. ' '20 Thus, subroga-
Is N.J. Rev. Stat. (i937) tit. 34, c. x5, §§ 107, io8, 114, 115; N.Y. Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law (McKinney, 1946) c. 67, §§ 108(2), xo9, iog-e(2), iog-f; N.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie,
1943) §§ io9, iIo, II6, II; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1937) tit. 77, §§ io55, io58; Wis. Stat.
(Brossard, r943) §§ I02.65( 3)(b), 5(b), 7(b).6 Hobbs, Workmen's Compensation Insurance 44o (1939).
17Tbid., at 443-44.
Is Maryland Trust Co. v. Poffenberger, i56 Md. 200, 144 Atl. 249 (1928); In re Freeman &
Brooks, i F. 2d 43o (C.C.A. 7th, 1924); Ricker v. Ricker, 248 Mass. 549, r43 N.E. 539 (1924);
4 Williston, Contracts § 1265 (rev. ed., 1936); Sheldon, Subrogation § 1 (1893); Mullen,
Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation, 3 Md. L. Rev. 201 (1939).
'
9 Wragg v. Wragg; 2o8 Iowa 939, 226 N.W. 99 (1929); McCabe v. Montgomery, ii
Ark. 523, 199 S.W. 548 (1917); Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Haven, 196 N.Y. 487, 89 N.E.
io82 (igog); i Williston, Contracts § 36A (rev. ed., 1936); 5 ibid., at § 1479; 3 Page, Contracts
§ 1520 (1920); Keener, Quasi-Contracts 315 (1893); Sheldon, Subrogation § 241 (1893);
Hope, Officiousness, is Corn. L. Q. 25 and 205, at 26 (1929).
20 Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Hackett, Hoff & Thiermann, 213 Wis. 426, 25o N.W. 866
(i933); Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Lennox, 263 Ill. App. 629 (1931); Pearce v. Bryant
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tion "is confined to the relation of principal and surety, and guarantors, or to
cases where a person, to protect his own junior lien is compelled to remove one
which is superior, and in cases of insurers paying losses.1' 21 Under this rule as
applied to the principal case, it can be argued that the plaintiff was not entitled
to common-law subrogation, since the State of Wisconsin was not obligated to
the defendant's employee to establish the security fund and to pay his compen-
sation awards. The plaintiff, if considered the agent of the state, appears, there-
fore, to have been in the position of a volunteer.
However, unqualified statements such as that quoted, excluding the volun-
teer from subrogation, seem too broad. Many Illinois and Wisconsin cases
adopting that rule have relied in part on dicta in early cases. = Some well-de-
fined exceptions are recognized. Subrogation or reimbursement is generally al-
lowed in cases of money paid by mistake, where the payor was under the misap-
prehension that he was obligated to pay or that payment was necessary to pro-
tect his own interest.23 Persons rendering services in emergencies, or where the
public interest is involved, may frequently recover the value of their services.24
Coal Co., 121 Ill. 590, 13 N.E. 56i (1887); Hough v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 57 Ill. 318 (1870);
Downer v. Miller, 15 Wis. 612 (1862). In Bank of Baraboo v. Prothero, 215 Wis. 552, 255
N.W. 126 (1934), the earlier Wisconsin cases were construed as indicating that subrogation
to a creditor's rights will be allowed to one paying a debtor only (i) if the person paying is
secondarily liable to the creditor, or (2) if he acted under compulsion, or necessity to protect
his own interests, or (3) if there was an agreement that he have security.
2 "Bishop v. O'Connor, 69 Ill. 431, 437 (1873).
- The Illinois case most frequently cited as authority for the rule restricting subrogation
is Hough v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 57 Ill. 318 (1870), where the rule was laid down as dictum
without citation of authority in its support. In this case subrogation to the rights of the de-
fendant company against sureties on its subagent's bond was allowed to its agent, Hough,
who, upon the subagent's defalcations, had remitted out of his own pocket premiums due the
defendant. The court held that Hough had made the payments to the defendant not as a
volunteer, but under compulsion, since the terms of his agency made him responsible to the
defendant for premiums. The early Wisconsin case frequently cited for the same rule is
Downer v. Miller, 15 Wis. 612 (1862), where the restrictive rule is again stated as dictum;
subrogation was there allowed to a lender who had advanced money to satisfy a foreclosure
judgment upon agreement with the borrower that the judgment was to be kept alive for the
lender's benefit. It was held that this agreement justified the court in keeping the judgment
alive and in subrogating the lender to it. The earlier cases in both jurisdictions denying subroga-
tion rely on Sanford v. McLean, 3 Paige (N.Y.) 117 (1832), where the restrictive rule again
seems to be announced as dictum, inasmuch as the funds advanced by the parties seeking sub-
rogation to the rights of judgment creditors had not been applied to the payment of the judg-
ments.
23 N.Y. Telephone Co. v. Board of Ed., 270 N.Y. iii, 20o N.E. 663 (1936); Gold Brand
Confectionery Co. v. Dimick, 276 Mass. 386, 177 N.E. 547 (i93); Mosser & Co. v. Cherry
River Boom & Lumber Co., 290 Pa. 67, 138 Atl. 85 (1927); McClary v. Mich. Cent. R. Co.,
102 Mich. 312, 6o N.W. 695 (1894); Blodgett v. Hitt, 29 Wis. 169 (1871); 5 Williston, Con-
tracts § 1574 (rev. ed., 1936); Woodward, Quasi Contracts c. 2 (2d ed., i913); Keener, Quasi-
Contracts c. 2, § 2, c. 6, § 2, c. 8, § 2 (1893).
24 Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N.E. 875 (1924); Barnes v. Starr, 144 Md. 218, 124
Atl. 922 (1923); Tryon v. Dornfeld, 13o Minn. 198, 153 N.W. 307 (1915); Perry County v.
Du Quoin, 99 Ill. 479 (i881); Keener, Quasi-Contracts c. 7 (1893); Hope, Officiousness, iS
Corn. L. Q. 25 and 205, at 238 (1929).
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In the mistake cases subrogation or reimbursement has been justified by saying
that the payment was not really voluntary, since made under mistake.25 In the
public interest cases, however, the person paying money or rendering services
seems able to force himself on the defaulting debtor as a creditor, if the former
has been in blameworthy default of a legal obligation affected with a public in-
terest. These cases have involved voluntary payment of burial expenses,26 neces-
sities furnished to families neglected by husbands, ' and support of paupers28 or
slaves.2 9 The nature of the recovery, as in the mistake cases, is quasi-contractual,
since performance of the legal obligation of another is said to be a "benefit" to
him whether or not he desired the "benefit."3o
The principal case can be regarded as fitting into and extending the public
interest exception, since the public welfare requires prompt, certain payment of
workmen's compensation awards.3s It marks a desirable change from the here-
tofore narrow application of subrogation in linois,32 and points toward a sug-
2S Gold Brand Confectionery Co. v. Dimick, 276 Mass. 386, 177 N.E. 547 (x93); Hope,
op. cit. supra note 24, at 218.
26Phillips v. Tribbey, 82 nd. App. 68, 141 N.E. 262 (1923); Foley v. Brocksmit, 119 Iowa
457, 93 N.W. 344 (i9o3); Marple v. Morse, i8o Mass. 5o8, 62 N.E. 966 (igo2).
27 Frank v. Carter, 219 N.Y. 3.5, 113 N.E. 549 (1916); Martin v. Beuter, 79 W.Va. 6o4,
91 S.E. 452 (1917); St. Vincent's Institute v. Davis, 129 Cal. 2o, 61 Pac. 477 (19oo); Prescott
v. Webster, 175 Mass. 316, 56 N.E. 577 (9oo).
28 Eckman v. Brady, 81 Mich. 70, 45 N.W. 5o2 (18go); Perry County v. Du Quoin, 99 Ill.
479 (1881).
29 Kellar v. Bate, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 13o (186o); Fairchild v. Bell, 2 Brevard's Law Rep. (S.C.)
129 (1807).
30 Carr v. Anderson, 154 Minn. 162, 191 N.W. 407 (1923); Ott v. Hentall, 7o N.H. 231,
47 Atl. go (1899); Hope, op. cit. supra note 24, at 49.
3' Another extension of the public interest exception is illustrated by a case in which sub-
rogation was allowed for the benefit of the plaintiff, who had under protest performed services
that the defendant's employees should have performed. The plaintiff had a contract to carry
mail from the defendant's cars to the post office. It was the defendant's duty, under federal
law, to move the mail from its cars across the station platform to plaintiff's truck, but the de-
fendant refused either to do this, or to pay the plaintiff for doing it. In allowing the plaintiff
to recover for the value of his services, the court said that though the plaintiff "would have.
performed his full duty by leaving the mail bags on the station platform," the plaintiff "was
not a volunteer, nor was he acting officiously"; he was performing duties in which the public
was interested." Grossbier v. Chicago, St.P., Minn. & 0. R. Co., x73 Wis. 5o3, 509, 585 N.W.
746, 748 (1921).
3' In the principal case the court said that subrogation is a much-favored doctrine, 329
Ill. App. 548, 552, 69 N.E. 2d 921, 923 (1946). The following two cases cited by the court are
not convincing as authority for this proposition. The results of both cases can be upheld
under a restricted doctrine of subrogation. In Cherry v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 372
Ill. 534, 25 N.E. 2d 11 (1940), bondholders of a bankrupt builder who had been compelled
by order of the bankruptcy court to satisfy the subcontractors' liens were held entitled to
subrogation to the rights of the subcontractors against the defendant, the surety of the gen-
eral contractor. In People ex. rel. Nelson v. Phillip State Bank & Trust Co., 307 IIl. App. 464,
30 N.E. 2d 771 (i94O), a county treasurer had deposited county funds in the bank, which be-
came insolvent. The plaintiff, the treasurer's surety, sought to obtain priority among the
bank's creditors by claiming subrogation to the rights of the state to preference. Subrogation
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gested development in the volunteer rule. One writer has advocated a distinc-
tion between a "volunteer" and an "officious volunteer," and would deny sub-
rogation only to the latter.33 Application of this rule would prevent the unwel-
come interference in private affairs, connoted by "officious," which the common
law has been so solicitious to prevent. Yet it would permit a more equitable
solution of those cases where the volunteer has acted in good faith, but is denied
recovery under the present rules restricting subrogation.34
was denied, the court saying that the plaintiff had only fulfilled its contract and must be
treated as a general creditor; since the state had been paid, it was not directly concerned. In
both these cases it was said that subrogation is a favored equitable doctrine, but no Illinois
cases were cited as authority. In the second case, moreover, the weight of authority would
allow subrogation. Richeson v. Crawford, 94 Ill. I65 (1879); 4 Williston, Contracts § 1267
(rev. ed. 1936).
33 Hope, op. cit. supra note 24; see Neely v. Jones, i6 W.Va. 625 (i88o). Similarly, the
common law rule denying subrogation to the volunteer is not found in the Roman law. Under
that system, when the affairs of an absent friend seemed to be suffering, one might manage
them voluntarily as the friend's agent to prevent loss, and recover for reasonably incurred
expenses. It was quite possible that at times the principal would have preferred that the
assistance should not be rendered. In that case, the test was whether the volunteered help had
really been to the principal's advantage, or would have been so, if it had succeeded. Radin,
Handbook of Roman Law § 112 (1927).
34 For example, in Chenango County Humane Society v. Polmatier, i88 App. Div. 419,
177 N.Y. Supp. ioi (ig9), the caretaker of defendant's farm had disappeared, unknown to the
defendant, leaving cattle without food or water. After learning of the situation, the plaintiff
entered and cared for the cattle. It was held that the plaintiff was a volunteer and could not
recover his expenses, although a statute made it a misdemeanor to mistreat animals. In
Macclesfield Corp. v. Great Central Ry., 11911] 2 K.B. 528, the defendant railway was re-
quired by statute to maintain a certain roadway, and had been notified by the plaintiffs, a
local highway authority, that the roadway needed repairs. The defendant having failed to act,
the plaintiffs made the necessary repairs, although not obligated by law to do so. It was held
the plaintiffs acted as volunteers and could not recover expenses from the defendant.
